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A Social Network Analysis of Corporate Venture Capital Syndication 
By Ju Kimberly Zheng 
 
The importance of social capital can be characterized by a well-known quote: it's not 
just what you know, but whom you know". Firms with rich social capital are more 
informed, more capable, and more competitive, because networks of resources are within 
their reach. Social capital is embedded in social networks, and social network analysis is 
the chief topic of this research. The network being examined contains 1126 venture 
capital (VC) programs, 206 of them being corporate venture programs, and the rest 
consisting of independent venture capital firms. Venture programs co-invest in portfolio 
firms following an identifiable pattern. This research attempts to explain this 
co-investment pattern using social network analysis. Four attributes of social networks 
are explored during this analysis: prominence, range, brokerage, and cohesion. The 
findings of the corporate venture capital network provide a number of implications for the 
theory of social capital. 
 The objective of the thesis is using social capital to examine the syndication patterns 
in a corporate VC network. The analysis of the corporate VC co-investment pattern 
supports four hypotheses. First, the corporate VC network is not cohesive. Second, most 
relationships in the network are indirect. Third, most prominent VCs are also the most 
powerful resource brokers in the network. Lastly, prominent VCs are likely to syndicate 
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1.1 Background of Research 
 
The venture capital industry has grown radically in the past few decades, even during the 
slow-down of the high-technology industry in the late 1990s. In the United States, 
venture capital investments grew from $3.3 billion in 1990 to $40 billion in 2001; and in 
Europe, such investments grew from $6.4 billion in 1998 to more than $10 billion in 1999 
(Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2003). One striking feature of venture capital activities is 
the large amount of co-operation involved in an investment process. Many researchers 
(e.g. Bygrave 1987, 1988; Lerner 1994, Lockett and Wright, 2001) have examined these 
cooperative activities. Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002) found that in Canada, venture 
capital co-investments yield higher returns on investment (average of 35% - 39%) 
compared to standalone investments (average of 15% - 20%) between the years 1991 and 
1997.   
 The formation of social networks characterizes the pattern of venture capital 
co-investments, with the ultimate goal of creating social capital within the networks. 
Social capital, like any other capital, is a valuable asset to venture capitalist firms (VCs) 1. 
Social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain goals that in its 
absence would not be possible (Coleman, 1988). Light and Karageorgis (1994) argue that 
social capital is a compensation mechanism to human capital. They propose that highly 
developed social networks can compensate deficient intellectual capital. If their claim is 
true, the VC co-investment activities are the act of seeking social capital. VCs collaborate 
                                                
1 For simplicity, venture capital firms will be referred to as VCs.  
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to benefit from each others experience, expertise, and information when seeking 
promising target firms to invest. Without co-investing with others, a VC may never 
achieve its desired investment objectives. Furthermore, social capital is trust-based. A VC 
offers favours to another VC and expects favours returned in the future, because favour 
reciprocation is an implicit obligation in a social network (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 
1995).   
 The objective of the thesis is using social capital to examine the syndication patterns 
in a corporate VC network. The analysis of the corporate VC co-investment pattern 
supports four hypotheses. First, the corporate VC network is not cohesive. Second, most 
relationships in the network are indirect. Third, most prominent VCs are also the most 
powerful resource brokers in the network. Lastly, prominent VCs are likely to syndicate 
with other prominent VCs.  
 
1.2 Definition of Syndication 
 
Syndication is a synonym for co-investment. Syndication is not exclusive to VCs.  It 
occurs with other types of investments such as pension funds, insurance funds, and 
investment funds of banks. An economist, Robert Wilson (1968, p.119), gives the 
following general definition of syndication: a group of individual decision-makers 
who must make a common decision under uncertainty, and who, as a result, will receive 
jointly a payoff to be shared among them. The key term is uncertainty, and the literature 
recognizes it as the most important rationale of syndication (e.g. Bygrave 1987, 1988).  
Ten years after Wilsons paper, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) agreed that syndication is an 
act to reduce uncertainty. They expressed that when situations are uncertain and 
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problematic, organizations attempt to establish relationships to access resources and exert 
control in the environment. There are recent definitions of syndication specific to venture 
capital. Jo (2000) defined syndication of venture capital investments as co-operation 
among VCs in funding a potentially promising firm. Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) 
further defined venture capital syndication as either two or more VCs sharing a particular 
round of financing, or different VCs investing in a given project at different times. 
 
1.3 Corporate Venture Capitalists 
 
This research places emphasis on the co-investment activities of corporate venture 
capitalists (corporate VCs). Corporate venturing involves creating venture funds by a 
parent corporation to invest in new venture opportunities. In contrast to traditional 
venture capital, corporate venturing is a strategic process of commercializing new 
products or services that may potentially benefit the parent firm.  
 There are three justifications for why corporate VCs are chosen as the unit of 
analysis for this thesis. First, corporate VCs are present for decades. The history traces as 
far back as the mid-1960s, about two decades after the first formal venture capital funds 
(Gompers and Lerner, the Directory, p.27). During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, 
over 25 percent of the Fortune 500 companies attempted corporate venture programs 
(Gompers and Lerner, the Directory, p.27). While corporate VCs form a small portion of 
the market for venture capital investing, the trend began to pick up significantly in the 
late 1990's (Kambil and Dickman, the Directory, p.9). Secondly, corporate VCs are 
important contributors of the venture capital industry. Corporate VC investments have 
been increasing in both the dollar amount and the number of new startups (called 
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portfolio firms) financed, totaling almost $16 billion in 2000 invested in more than 1,900 
portfolio firms (Ernst & Young, 2001). Lastly, despite their long-lasting presence and 
economical significance in the venture capital industry, corporate VCs have not received 
much attention in the VC literature. Most empirical studies are primarily on traditional 
VCs (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). This research aims to contribute a wider field of 
knowledge on corporate VCs to existing literature, specifically in the area of VC 
syndication.  
 
1.3.1 Differences between Corporate VCs and Traditional VCs 
 
Corporate VCs differ from traditional VCs in a number of ways. The first difference is 
their organizational structure. A corporate VC is normally an individual unit of a parent 
corporation with some degree of autonomy or a functional unit serving as part of the 
parent corporations research and development group. Unlike the traditional VCs that are 
usually limited partners, corporate VCs are an important influence on the performance of 
portfolio firms. The second difference is the lifespan of an investment. Corporate venture 
programs have considerably shorter duration compared to traditional VC investments 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2002). A typical corporate venture program terminates in four 
years while a traditional VC investment lasts up to fifteen years (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001, 2002). The last difference, which is also the most important difference, is the 
investment motive. Corporate VCs invest in portfolio firms for strategic reasons as 
opposed to financial reasons. The corporate VCs, especially ones from research and 
development groups of the parent corporation, strive to exploit industry knowledge to 
develop products or services that can potentially provide competitive advantage for the 
 
 5
parent corporation. The portfolio firm may be a prospective supplier of the corporate VC 
parent, or a cash-hungry startup that has the potential to penetrate new markets for the 
parent. In contrast, the primary investment motive of traditional VCs is financial return.  
 
 
1.3.2 Different Corporate VC Structures 
 
Corporate VCs employ a variety of structures in the management of their corporate 
venturing activities. Paul, Zivian and Fieweger (2002, p.16-17) from Baker & McKenzie2, 
describe four structures of corporate VCs.  
1. Investments in Externally Managed Funds 
An equivalent expression of this type of fund structure is fund of funds, that is a 
venture capital fund investing in other venture capital funds or other securities. This type 
of structure is suitable for a corporate VC if its sole motive of investment is financial 
return. Fund of funds does not support strategic collaboration between the portfolio firm 
and the corporate VC.  
 It is important to note that this research does not consider this type of corporate VC 
structure. When referring to corporate VC investments, this thesis exclusively implies the 
following three corporate VC structures.  
2. Separate Corporate Venture Funds 
The corporate VC is setup as a separate unit of the parent corporation with an 
independently defined budget. Internal fund managers usually carry interests in the fund 
to produce financial returns. Because the corporate VC receives some degree of 
                                                
2 M. Paul, B. Zivian and M. Fieweger are the contributing authors to the article, Structuring a Result 
Oriented Coporate Venturing Program in the 2002 Corporate Venturing Directory and Yearbook. More 
details of the four structures the authors illustrated can be found in the Directory on pages 16 and 17. 
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autonomy from the parent corporation, there are less internal pressures to invest in 
startups where the prospects for a financial return are secondary to other corporate 
interests. Therefore, the financial and strategic goals of investment coexist.  
3. In-house Venture Groups 
The in-house venture groups are very closely involved with internal corporate units such 
as research and development, marketing, executive offices, or a combination of many 
units. Corporate VCs with this type of structure primarily pursue the parent corporations 
strategic goals other than or in addition to financial return.  
4. Incubators 
In contrast to the in-house venture groups, the incubators are the friends of startups. They 
provide portfolio firms a collection of services, particularly industry expertise, that help a 
portfolio firm commercialize their products successfully. Through frequent interactions 
with entrepreneurs, incubators learn entrepreneurial lessons that in turn benefit the parent 
corporation.  
 
1.4 Overview of Research Method 
 
Social network analysis is a study of the relations of actors in a network, and is employed 
to find the patterns of corporate VC syndication. It strives to derive social structure 
empirically based on observed relationships between members or actors of a network. A 
relation is a social tie between actors. The three dimensions of social relations are 
direction, strength, and content (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Direction indicates which 
actor sends or receives the relation; strength defines frequency of interaction between two 
actors; and content defines a specific substantive connection among actors. The four 
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attributes of the VC network are prominence, range, brokerage, and cohesion. 
Prominence measures who is in charge; range measures how far an actor can reach 
other actors; brokerage measures the extent of bridging connections; and cohesion 
describes the cohesiveness of the whole network. The three social relations and four 
network attributes of the corporate VC network are examined and discussed throughout 
the body of the thesis, and finally some important findings of the network are reported.  
 The data used to examine the patterns are coded from the 2002 Corporate Venturing 
Directory and Yearbook published by Asset Alternatives and VentureOne. The 
syndication information from the Directory is coded using Microsoft Excel 2002. 
UCINET 6.0 is the software used to compute various measurements of the VC social 
network. UCINET 6.0 is chosen because of its user friendliness, data processing 
capabilities, and its ability to work with Excel data files.  
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 prepares the building blocks for the thesis. 
It presents the readers with some background information necessary for this research. 
Chapter 2 reviews literature on social capital, social network analysis and venture capital 
syndication. It interweaves the seemingly two independent areas of research, social 
capital and venture capital, and brings them to a common ground for discussion. Chapter 
3 explains the research method and process of data coding. Chapter 4 reports key findings 
from analyses of corporate VC network data utilizing UCINET 6.0. Finally, Chapter 5 
presents the implications of key findings and draws four conclusions about the corporate 





Delimitations determine the scope of research. First, this research attempts to find 
patterns of VC syndication on a macro level, and does not make any conclusions on VC 
attributes on a micro level. The individual VC attributes include industry, geography, and 
funding stages preferences. Second, syndication data from only one year does not allow 
analysis on the evolution of the network. Instead, only a snapshot of the network is 
available. In fact, the network is constantly changing, and the snapshot does not provide 
any information on how the same network behaves at present time. Lastly, this research 
chooses social capital as the explanation of network patterns. Plausible explanations from 
other competitive theories, such as the transactions cost theory, are not shown.  
 
 9
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This literature review explores two separate yet related literatures, social capital and 
venture capital syndication, and establishes a link between the two areas of research. The 
chapter provides an overview of social capital from two different approaches. It shows 
how social networks may serve as a proxy to social capital, and how venture capital 
networks are equivalent to social networks. Several rationales of venture capital 
co-investments as well as timing patterns of co-investments are discussed. Next, the 
chapter describes transactions cost economics, an alternative theory that could explain the 
patterns of venture capital co-investments. Finally, it ends with some expectations of 
findings derived from the literature review.  
 
2.2 Social Capital 
 
The concept of social capital has gained popularity in the study of organizations in the 
1990s, and is seen as a productive outcome of social networks (Gabbay & Leenders, 
2001). Coleman (1990), Burt (1992) and Putnam (1993) have done influential work on 
social capital. Despite its popularity, the definition of social capital is not consistently 
defined (Burt, 2000, Gabbay & Leenders, 2001).  Coleman (1990, p.302) defines social 
capital as some aspect of a social structure, facilitating certain actions in individuals who 
are within the structure Bourdieu (1997, p.49) states that social capital is the sum of 
the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of 
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
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acquaintance and recognition. Putnam (1995, p.67) defines social capital as the features 
of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Gabbay & Leenders (1999, p.3) 
extends social capital to the corporate level and defines corporate social capital as the 
set of resources, tangible or virtual, that accrue to a corporate player through the players 
social relationships, facilitating the attainment of goals. Gabbay & Leenders (2001) 
argue that social capital created by the relationships of individuals should apply to the 
organizational level because individuals play out and mediate relationships in their 
organizations in the first place. They also express that most important business deals rely 
on interpersonal trust, and this does not mean that these transactions should be 
categorized as a function of the network at the individual level (p.9).  
 Gabbay & Leender (2001) also propose two views on the creation of social capital, 
one is natural creation, and the other is purposeful creation. The natural creation is a 
result of normal social interactions, where members leave and enter a network of 
relationships over time. The more commonly adopted understanding is that members of a 
network create social capital for their own benefit (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992; Gabbay 
& Leenders, 1999). Within the second point of view, social capital is a creation of 
strategic behaviour of members, rather than a by-product of normal social interaction. 
 All the definitions include three common elements: relationships, members that 
together form the relationships, and networks as a result of members and relationships. 
Members can be individuals or organizations. In addition, despite the different 
understanding of social capital creation, both views by Gabbay and Leender (2001) stress 
the importance of social capital because it creates value to the members involved. 
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Whenever the social capital is lost the income from it also disappears, and may never 
return unless new social capital is slowly accumulated (Jacobs, 1961). Therefore, the 
formation and retention of social capital is significant, and social networks are an 
important source of social capital. 
 
2.2.1 Instrumental Approach to Social Capital 
Not only is social capital vaguely defined, but also there are two conflicting 
understandings of the concept that Johanson (2001) calls the instrumental view and the 
expressive view. The instrumental view focuses on the benefits of structural hole, a 
theory first developed by Ronald Burt. He defines a structural hole as a relationship of 
non-redundancy between two contacts (Burt, 1992, p.18). In Burts view, sparse 
networks are beneficial because each contact serves as a bridge to non-redundant sources 
of information and they help network members gain control in a competitive environment. 
Burt (1992) found that non-redundant networks lead to faster career promotion. A similar 
study by Higgins (2001) reveals that more non-redundant contacts lead to higher ability 
to switch careers.  A structural hole is a path to control and information benefits, and 
is equivalent to the liaison positions in organizational analysis (Johanson, 2001). Liaison 
positions may be introduced to enable direct communication between formally separate 
units and functions (Mintzberg, 1979, p.162). In a broader scale, liaison positions can be 
used to provide integration to formally differentiated organizations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967). In Burts (1992)s language, structural hole acts as the only bridging connection 
between two otherwise disconnected networks. Because of its advantageous position, 
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structural holes offer attractive opportunities for exploitation in a competitive 
environment (Johanson, 2001). 
 
2.2.2 Expressive Approach to Social Capital 
In contrast to the instrumental view, the expressive view promotes cohesive networks 
because they enable the construction of trust and an obligation to cooperate among the 
members in the network (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995). The greater the number of 
reciprocal associations between members in a network, the more social capital the 
network can offer (Coleman, 1990a). Coleman (1988) used the analogy of credit slips to 
describe the flow of financial capital based on trust.  A quote from Coleman illustrates 
his idea, if A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this 
establishes an expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B. This obligation can be 
conceived as a credit slip held by A (Coleman, 1988, p.S102). Therefore, a cohesive 
social network facilitates economic transactions by circulating Colemans credit slips 
(Johanson, 2001).  
 Trust is an important part of social capital (Nooteboom, 2001, p.196). Trust reduces 
transactions cost (Nooteboom, 2001; Johanson, 2001) because legal contracts and 
monitoring costs can be prevented. Moreover, trust cannot be purchased, installed, or 
forced upon anyone, and without trust relationships cannot arise (Nooteboom, 2001). 
Trust emerges because obligations are enforceable through the power of the community 
to impose implicit rules on its members should they fail to comply with the established 
norms (Portes, 1998). Consequently, there is no need to be cautious about other partners 
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agendas, because any unethical behaviour will result in rejection from the social network 
(Ferrary, 2002). 
 
2.2.3 The Balance of Social Capital  
 
Johanson (2001) stresses the need to balance social capital between the two approaches. 
While each approach, instrumental or expressive, has its own scope of analysis, they are 
not mutually exclusive. Johanson (2001) explains that the instrumental approach takes a 
restricted position by analyzing ego networks, that is, networks consisting of a focal 
individual and his/her direct contacts and contacts among of his/her contacts. On the 
other hand, the expressive approach does not limit its analysis to such restricted networks, 
but rather looks at networks as a whole. Therefore, the boundaries of ego networks may 
easily cross those of whole networks, making ego networks a special case in the analysis 
of expressive benefits.  
 There are shortcomings associated with each approach, thus achieving a fine balance 
between the two extreme ends is the ideal approach to understanding social capital 
(Johanson, 2001). After studying the garment (1997) and banking (1999) industries, Uzzi 
suggests that when organizations perform tasks to succeed in market competition, 
influential bonds may provide the most social capital. In contrast, strong community 
bonds may hurt a firm financially, limiting its options and its access to information about 
the market. Gargiulo and Bernassi (1999) found that cohesive social networks severely 
limit the flow of information into a firm, preventing managers from grasping their 
organizations fit with the competitive environment. Conversely, if every member in an 
organization tried to maximize his/her structural holes, the organization may be in danger 
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of falling apart (Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998). All the before mentioned shortcomings of 
each approach are generalized as social liability by Gabbay and Leenders (1999, 2001).  
 The most distinguishing difference between the two approaches is found in the 
beneficiary of social interaction (Johanson, 2001, p.235). While the individual 
members of a network enjoy the power of control and information benefits (Burt, 1992), 
the trust and obligation to cooperate stemming out of the expressive approach benefit 
every participant in the network and thus the social capital becomes a public good 
(Coleman, 1990).  
 Table 2.1 provides a comparison between the two approaches. The table was 
assembled by Jan-Erik Johanson (2001, p.234) in her work of comparing the 
characteristics of structural hole theory and social capital theory.   
Table 2.1 Some characteristics of structural hole theory and social capital theory 
 
 Structural Hole Theory 
(Instrumental Approach) 
Social Capital Theory 
(Expressive Approach) 
Network Sparse Cohesive 
Benefits Instrumental Expressive 
Social Environment Competitive  Cooperative 
Scope of Analysis Ego networks Ego/total networks 
Beneficiary  Actor Group 
 
Source: Johanson (2001, p. 234) 
 
2.3 Social Networks as Social Capital 
 
In their definitions of social capital, many researchers (e.g. Coleman, 1990, Burt, 1992, 
Gabbay & Leenders, 2001) used social capital and social network interchangeably. 
White (2002) explicitly claims that social network is a proxy to social capital. The 
networks are constructed through linkages and practices between individuals and 
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organizations, within and between communities (p.260). He explains that social capital 
is embedded in an intelligent social structure, where members (or actors) use it to achieve 
their goals through the networks they belong to for social support. Flap (1991) brings a 
similar notion. He argues that social capital is related to social networks in terms of size, 
strength and resources enjoyed by those members in the network. Lin (1986) asserts that 
relationships are sources of material, informational and emotional aid. Lins claim 
implies that those sources of aid are equivalent to social capital generated by an 
individuals relationships. Social capital is difficult to measure because of its intangibility 
and its ambiguous definition. Nevertheless, principles for measuring it have existed for 
over fifty years (Scott, 1992), and social network is merely another mechanism to 
conceptualize and measure social capital (White, 2002). 
 Social capital theory is chosen for this research instead of an alternative theory, the 
transactions cost theory for many reasons. The rest of this section discusses the 
transactions cost theory and offers some justifications for why it is not adopted.  
 Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985, 1993, 1996) has done seminal work on opportunism 
in transactions cost economics. In short, he argues against the notion of trust. Instead, he 
emphasizes opportunism, the monitoring of performance, and sanction of punishment 
(Nooteboom, 2001). Williamson (1993) subjects trust as unnecessary and misleading.  
He asks the question whether trust goes beyond calculative self-interest. If it does not, 
trust adds no value to ones existing actions and is thus deemed unnecessary; but if it 
does, trust is blind, which is unwise and should be avoided. Therefore, according to 
Williamson, trust should be discarded either way. The replacement for trust is the idea of 
hostages (Williamson, 1996; Kuan, 2003). He defines mutual reliance relation in 
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which each party depends on the other parties for something valuable. In venture capital 
co-investments, the involved parties alternate roles as lead investor and passive partner, 
which are the informed and the uninformed. If one party attempts to misrepresent 
information, the other party takes possession of its hostage, in this case its share of 
investment. 
 There are three justifications for not adopting the transactions cost theory in this 
research. First, the theory disregards the reputation effect on organizations. It assumes the 
possibility of syndication opportunities even after an investing partner cheats. In reality, 
if a firm is convicted of unethical behaviour, it is unlikely that others in the firms 
network will be willing to cooperate with it in the future. Secondly, this theory neglects 
inter-firm learning (Nooteboom, 2001). Firms collaborate not just to seek opportunism 
now, but also to learn the other partys core competence for long-run benefits. Finally, 
trust can go beyond calculative self-interest without being irrational (Nooteboom, 2001). 
Social norms are built on a rational foundation in the sense that they are based on 
successful performance in the past.  When a community deems observed behaviour 
unacceptable, action will be automatically triggered (Ferrary, 2003; Nooteboom, 2001). 
 
2.4 Venture Capital Network as a Social Network  
 
A social network consists of a finite set of actors and the relations defined on them 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.17). In the context of venture capital syndication, the 
actors are the VCs, and the relations are co-investment activities amongst the VCs.  
 Wasserman and Faust (1994) define three dimensions of social relations as direction, 
strength, and content. Direction indicates which actor sends or receives the relation; 
 
 17
strength defines frequency of interaction between two actors; and content defines the kind 
of resources being exchanged, whether information or financial capital, both of which are 
common in venture capital syndication. The details of these three dimensions will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 There are five characteristics of social network analysis: prominence, cohesion, range, 
brokerage, and structural equivalence. The first four characteristics are more applicable to 
venture capital networks, and shall be discussed in further detail. Prominence indicates 
who has power in the network; cohesion describes attributes of the whole network, 
showing the presence of strong socializing relationships among actors, and cohesion 
concerns direct ties (Burt, 1992, p. 19); range indicates the extent of an actors network 
(Haythornthwaite, 1996); and brokerage, indicates bridging connections to other 
networks (Burt, 1992b; Nohria, 1992). Finally, structural equivalence shows identical 
ties to and from all other actors in the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p.356). The 
first four characteristics of social network analysis and the three dimensions of social 
relations will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.5 Corporate Venturing and Syndication Rationales 
 
Corporate venturing is an activity whereby established companies stimulate innovations 
within their own company or in outside organizations. Many independent venture capital 
groups seek strategic partnerships with corporations as a source of competitive advantage 
in technical knowledge and experience (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  The reasons for 
corporations to invest in entrepreneurial start-ups are more strategic than financial with a 
justified explanation: if an investment is not likely to yield strategic benefits but only 
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attractive financial benefits, the parent firm is in threat of creating a potential rival 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001, 2002). In a study of corporate and independent venture 
investment comparisons, Gompers and Lerner (2001) found that corporate programs 
without a close strategic fit with their investments are much less stable than those of 
independent funds with a close strategic fit. In this section, three rationales of syndication 
applied on corporate VCs are derived from Gomper and Lerners work, of which one 
stems from the advantages of the client firm, while the other two stem from the objectives 
of the investing corporations. 
 
2.5.1 Increased Investment Lifespan  
Gompers and Lerner (2002) found that the corporate venture programs have a 
significantly shorter duration compared to independent venture capital investments. A 
typical corporate venture capital program terminates within four years of its launch, 
whereas independent venture capital investments last approximately ten to fifteen years 
(Gomper and Lerner, 2001, 2002). What is the reason behind such a significant difference?  
Gomper and Lerner (2002) provided two explanations. First, they argue that dissolving 
the investment effort is a response to technological change. New entrants often exploit 
technological breakthroughs more aggressively than the established parent firms, and 
often product leaders have rapidly lost their leading market position after many years of 
dominance. Corporate venture capital programs may be a response to these short-run 
periods of technological discontinuity. Secondly, they point out that the short-term nature 
of corporate venture programs is a result of defections of their most successful investors, 
who become frustrated at their low level of compensation. It is not difficult to understand 
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why client firms are reluctant to seek funding solely from a corporate venture capital 
program.  In contrast, independent venture funds normally make long-term investments, 
and do not pull the plug in a matter of few years because they commit to the investment 
duration in partnership agreements, whereas corporate VCs withdraw investments 
whenever they see fit. From a client firms perspective, it is most optimal to obtain 
long-term financial support from an independent venture capital firm while still acquiring 
the technical experience and expertise from a corporation leading in their field of interest. 
Therefore, the best choice for a client firm is seeking syndication from both parties. 
 
2.5.2 Acquiring Investment Expertise 
New venture creation is not a core competence of most corporations. Managers of 
corporate venture units mostly come from the parent company who are considered naïve 
investors compared to independent venture capitalists who do new venture investments 
for a living. Gompers and Lerner (2001) presented a couple of key results to support this 
observation. First, corporations are unable to recruit investment talents from the venture 
industry, who are used to the attractive 20 percent profit-sharing rule, which 
corporations are reluctant to compensate. Secondly, key personnel, frustrated at not 
receiving their share of profits, leave the corporation. Corporate venturing units are left 
with few choices. They can either follow the 20 percent profit-sharing rule to attract 
investment talents, or become passive investors only (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). If 
neither seems appropriate, syndication with an independent venture capital firm becomes 
an appealing choice. 
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 From a corporate VCs point of view, the ideal syndication partner would be an 
independent VC having the investment expertise. Thus, independent VCs that have 
influence or power in the corporate VCs network, and who is in demand (Nohria, 1992) 
tend to be the first candidates corporate VCs approach.  
 
2.5.3 Strengthening the Corporate Venturing Brand Name 
It is tough enough for corporations to attract investment experts, but to make the problem 
worse, new corporate venturing programs also have a hard time attracting sweet deals.  
Many corporations launch venture programs with a mindset that their core business brand 
name will earn them respect and make them deals. They then discover that their venture 
program is not successful without conference presentations, and press releases to 
publicize the company activities (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). The venture capital 
community is close-knit; many leading firms have syndicated with one another for 
decades.  Therefore, tapping into the network of this community, i.e. having a high 
degree of range in corporate VCs network is a shortcut to potentially rewarding 
investments. Gompers and Lerner (2001) suggest several strategies to strengthen the 
corporate venturing brand name, and many of them involve syndication with a 
knowledgeable VC. Their recommended strategies include recruiting the funds 
investment professionals from the venture capital community; simultaneously invest in 
venture capital partnerships specializing in similar technologies; and/or joint ventures 




2.6 General Rationales of Syndication 
 
Syndication does not only apply to corporate VCs, but is a common practice in the 
venture capital industry. Why do VCs syndicate in general? The rationales cover a wide 
spectrum of viewpoints. Some VCs syndicate to benefit from each others knowledge and 
from the higher returns of the investments (Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Lockett and Wright, 
2001), while and others syndicate to prevent hazards such as asymmetric information and 
competition (Bygrave, 1987; Brander, Amit, and Antweiler, 2002; Casamatta and 
Haritchabalet, 2003). 
  The following seven rationales of syndication generally explain why VCs syndicate.  
The first five rationales come from gaining benefits, while the last two rationales come 
from preventing hazards. 
 
2.6.1 Exchange of Resources 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) pioneer the resource exchange model. They claim that the 
reasons for organizations to cooperate are to gather information, to transmit information, 
to obtain commitment and support, and to legitimate the organization. They also propose 
that the degree of interconnectedness between two organizations is a function of 
uncertainty3, concentration4, and munificence5 of the industry that the firms reside.  
Bygrave (1988) applies the resource exchange model to the venture capital industry, and 
obtains empirical evidence to validate his model. Bygrave (1987) claims that by 
                                                
3 Uncertainty is the degree to which the outcome of an event cannot be predicted (Bygrave, 1988). 
4 Concentration is the number of competing firms in an industry (Bygrave 1988). 
5 Munificence is the degree to which the resources that a firm needs to gather from its environment are 





syndicating investment deals, VCs obtain support and commitment from one another, and 
by participating in syndications, especially with industry leaders, they increase their 
reputation. In his study of U.S. venture capital industry, he found that in the state of 
California, there is not only greater connectedness among VCs, but also greater intensity 
in their connections. This result is particularly true with the VCs that specialize in new 
high-technology venture investments. His finding confirms the prediction of the resource 
exchange model because California has the highest concentration of VCs in the U.S. (See 
Figure 2.1), and VCs specializing in high-tech investments bear more uncertainty in their 
investments. Such high concentration and high connectedness of VCs imply high 
cohesiveness in the network. Actors in the California venture capital network have 
similar attributes. They are in the same geographic region, and they are mostly interested 
in including high-technology firms in their portfolios. Information transmissions between 
firms consist of technical data, work advice, political opinions, and office rumors (Knoke, 
2001). Resources exchanged can also be tangibles such as goods, services, and money 
(Haythornthwaite, 1996). Patterns of exchange show how information and goods move in 
an environment, as well how actors in the network are positioned to exercise control of 




Figure 2.1 Geographic distributions of venture capital investments 
Larger circles (proportionate to the square root of the number of target companies in a zip 
code) indicate the presence of more portfolio firms. 
 
 
Source: Sorenson, O. and Toby E. Stuart (2001): Syndication Networks and the Spatial 
Distribution of Venture Capital Investments, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 106, No. 6, 
pp. 1546-1588. 
 
 Lockett and Wright (2001) subdivides resources into financial and non-financial 
resources, the latter being largely market information. They assert that by sharing 
resources, all partners involved are able to reduce uncertainty and increase confidence in 
investments in both ex-ante and ex-post stages. The ex-ante stage involves selecting the 
optimal investment from a list of potential investments, with information being the most 
important resource, because it reduces the probability of selecting a lemon. The ex-post 
stage involves subsequent management of investments with cash being the most 
important resource, because later-stage ventures demand more cash to expand operations.  
By pooling financial and non-financial resources, all partners benefit from comparatively 
greater results. Therefore, by strategically bonding together, all actors in the network 
benefit from less risks and better quality deals. The strength of bonds is considered strong 
because resource exchange is a two-way relationship, and the frequency of exchange is 
high, particularly in the California region where VCs exhibit high interconnectedness.   
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2.6.2 Diversification of Financial Risk 
The risk-sharing hypothesis originates from finance. Wilson (1968), Lerner (1994), 
Lockett and Wright (2001) believe that VCs undertake syndication in order to diversify 
their portfolios and reduce overall risk. Because of the lack of information in the ex-ante 
stage, a VC does not always realize the actual risk associated with an investment until he 
goes forward. However, he/she cannot liquidate investment immediately after realizing 
his/her mistake; in other words he/she cannot divest the lemon right way. Syndication 
thus provides an attractive means of sharing risk on a deal-by-deal basis that may help to 
reduce overall portfolio risk (Lockett and Wright, 2001). Furthermore, the scope for both 
syndicating out deals as well as syndicating into deals provides more freedom and more 
diversity of investments. Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) discover higher variability, 
i.e. higher risk in syndicated investments, suggesting that by syndicating VCs can achieve 
diversification. In addition, Lerner (1994) suggests that VCs constantly try not to 
under-perform their peers, hence investing in many syndicated investments, a venture 
fund can achieve the effect of diversification. The ability to diversify risk by syndication 
shows a VCs high degree of brokerage in its network, which is its ability to tap into 
resources in other industries or geographic locations. For example, if firm A has no 
experience in investing in the semiconductor industry, syndicating with firm B that has 
the expertise in the semiconductor industry greatly reduces As investment risks. The 
ability of A to syndicate with B shows As resource access. Furthermore, having the 
power to convince B to syndicate with A shows As influence on B.  As influence 
translates to high degree of range in its VC network.  
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 In spite of the benefits of diversification mentioned above, the main drawback 
resides in the transaction costs each time a firm syndicates. It is possible that transaction 
costs exceed the gains of portfolio diversification. Thus, VCs must be aware of the 
trade-off between risk reduction and transaction costs associated with any addition to the 
portfolio or reduction of deals from the portfolio (Lockett and Wright, 2001). 
 
2.6.3 Superior Selection of Investments 
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) suggested the idea of superior investment selection by syndication.  
They show that in hierarchical organizations, investments proceed only if a number of 
independent observers agree, and that decisions made by many parties are superior to 
ones made by a single party. The same logic applies to venture capital investments.  
Two or more independent VCs screen projects more effectively than one VC would 
because they bring in different perspectives, and each learns something from the others 
evaluation (Brander, Amit, and Antweiler, 2002). Ultimately, another VCs willingness to 
invest in a potentially promising firm may serve as confirmation for the lead venture 
capitalists decision to invest (Pence, 1982). A quote from Lerner (1994, p.17) provides 
further illustration: Venture capitalists prefer syndicating most deals for a simple reason 
 it means that they have a chance to check out their own thinking against other 
knowledgeable sources. In the study of 271 pre-IPO biotechnology firms in the U.S., 
Lerner (1994) found that lead VCs prefer investing with other VCs with similar levels of 
experience, especially in early stages. This fact confirms his hypothesis, because the lead 
prefers to ask other experienced VC for confirmation during the most uncertain stage of 
investment. From a network perspective, if actors seek each other to bond because of 
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similar experience, then their network displays a high degree of cohesion, which means 
actors that have common relationships tend to syndicate on deals.  
 
2.6.4 Reciprocation of Deal Flow 
An important intangible resource for a VC is deal flow, which is the available list of 
potentially promising investments. It is clear that VCs want to be in a position to gain as 
many deals as possible so they can make their investment selections from a wide supply 
of deals. Deal flow becomes even more important in times when too much money is 
chasing too few deals. VCs share the pool of available investments by syndicating in and 
out deals with one another, and hence their relationship is two-way. By syndicating out 
deals to another VC, the lead VC expects the other party to syndicate future deals with 
him. As a result, its deal flow is increased (Lockett and Wright, 2001). In the social 
capital literature, Coleman (1988) relates reciprocation closely to trustworthiness, and 
describes such favour swapping as people are always doing things for each other. The 
reciprocation of deal flow strengthens the tie between two actors in the network. Clearly, 
the more deal flows incur between two actors, the greater the strength of their 
relationship. 
 If reciprocation of deal flow is the sole reason for venture capitalists to syndicate, 
then they do not add as much value to the portfolio firms as they could or should. From 
the standpoint of the client firms, they should avoid approaching VCs with the only intent 
of deal reciprocation. Such a biased objective is difficult to spot, and is often out of 




2.6.5 Act of Window-dressing 
Lakeonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) claim that pension funds window 
dress. Money managers adjust their portfolios at the end of the quarter by buying firms 
whose shares have appreciated and selling losers in order to impress sponsors. Lerner 
(1994) argues that venture capital funds behave the same way. VCs often try to prove 
their quality by entering successful investments on later stages to earn publicity. To be 
able to join these sweet investments, they must syndicate with other experienced or 
reputable VCs. For instance, a corporation with no prior investment experience chooses 
to syndicate with a well-known independent VC for the purpose of being known even if 
the corporation only plays as a limited partner in the investment. Another example would 
be a newly established telecommunications company trying to co-invest with AOL in a 
start-up firm, with the intention of using the reputation of AOL to strengthen its brand 
name into the telecommunications industry. 
 Experienced VCs tend to occupy central positions in the VC network. They are 
actors in the network with high degree of prominence and range, both features are 
important for identifying opportunities (Haythornthwaite, 1996). Hence, these 
experienced VCs possess power to retain sweet deals, and are often approached by 
young VCs that try to window-dress. The relationship is one-way, as the experienced 
VC has no advantage, thus no intention to initiate syndication with a young VC unless the 
young VC has considerable financial resources (Lerner, 1994). Because the sole purpose 
of syndication is for the young VC to obtain the brand name or reputation of the 
experienced VC, the relationship between the syndicating parties is considered weak   
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 A related notion to window dressing is grandstanding suggested by Gomper 
(1996). He states that young VCs have incentives to grandstand, which is taking actions 
to signal their ability to potential investors, either by taking the client firm public 
prematurely or by trying to syndicate with other well-known venture capitalists in later 
stages.  
 
2.6.6 Mitigation of Asymmetric Information 
Unlike the other rationales presented previously, this rationale of syndication stems from 
hazard prevention. The hazard in question is asymmetric information. Syndication 
normally involves a lead VC and one or more passive partners. The lead VC is involved 
in the client firms day-to-day operations, and thus has a better understanding of the firm 
and holds an informational advantage over the other passive partners. The firm-specific 
information that the lead obtains during his monitoring activities can give him 
considerable bargaining power in subsequent rounds of financing (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1994). The lead also has the incentive to conceal the true value of a private sale, and 
deceive the passive partners, taking their rightful share (Kuan 2003). In order to mitigate 
the problems associated with asymmetric information, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) 
propose an instrument called fixed-fraction contract. With this contract in effect, the 
lead holds a constant stake of equity in the client firm, and finances that same fraction of 
any future investment. This implies that later-round financings must be syndicated. The 
VCs payoff is independent of the future security prices, and therefore it has no incentive 
to misrepresent the value of the client firm. The relationship between the lead and the 
limited partner is two-way, since the lead and the limited partner must swap positions in 
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later rounds. The relationship is built upon lack of trust and is considered strong because 
it is bound by a fixed-fraction contract and the VCs collaborate for a long period. 
 
2.6.7 Prevention of Competition 
VCs are competitors as well as suppliers of information and financial resources to each 
other (Bygrave, 1987). Banding together as opposed to competing, VCs may improve 
their bargaining power with entrepreneurs (Brander, Amit, and Antweiler, 2002).  
Banding is especially beneficial when attractive deals are scarce. Casamatta and 
Haritchabalet (2003) speculate that asking another VC for information is potentially 
dangerous for the initiator, because it is in effect revealing the very existence of an 
investment opportunity. There is a possibility that it is creating a rival who might later 
obtain exclusive financing of that hot deal. Therefore, they suggest that the two VCs 
should syndicate to share the rent in order to prevent harmful competition. They then 
conclude that syndication is a result of information gathering as well as competition 
prevention. 
 
2.7 Timing of Syndication  
 
Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) used data from the Canadian venture capital 
industry and found that syndication normally occurred soon after the first venture capital 
investment. More specifically, of those new ventures that received syndicated 
investments from multiple VCs, approximately 70 percent received financing from a 
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second VC within the same calendar year. They generalized the following three major 
patterns of syndication: 
1) First investment from a VC occurs in the early growth stage6 or later, with 
syndication occurring simultaneously or shortly after (Most Common). 
2) The lead VC makes a seed investment7 or a startup investment8, followed by 
syndication at a later stage. 
3) Syndication occurs at the seed or startup stage (Least Common). 
The most common pattern of syndication is most risk-averse, and the least common 
pattern is most risky, since the seed stage bears the most uncertainty, and late stages bear 
the least uncertainty in comparison.  
 Lerner (1994)s findings from the U.S. biotechnology industry generally agree with 
the Canadian results. He found that established VCs syndicate with peers who have 
similar levels of experience for the first-round investments. The reason is that early-stage 
investments involve more uncertainty, so the need for quality information is greater, and 
only more experienced VCs can provide such quality information. They syndicate with 
less experienced VCs only in the later rounds because younger VCs are seldom invited to 
syndicate, thus they provide inexpensive capital in return. The growing venture on the 
other hand desperately needs cash to expand operations; therefore, it is a win-win 
situation to syndicate with younger VCs in later stages. Furthermore, having already 
decided to provide capital to a new venture, the lead VC is less concerned about 
confirming his judgment. 
                                                
6 The authors define early growth stage as the period after the initial sales but before sales becomes a major 
source for ongoing operations. 
7 Seed investment is an investment based on the entrepreneurs idea and expertise.  





The contribution of VCs in the development of new technologies and businesses is 
undeniable. They are active gatherers and suppliers of information (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978); they invest for the suppliers of capital and benefit the users of capital by providing 
equity on a confidential basis and non-financial resources, such as industry expertise 
(Fried and Hisrich, 1994).    
 More importantly, the significance of social network is evident in the patterns of 
venture capital syndication, where social capital is embedded in the relationships within 
the VC networks. Social capital encompasses trust, community and reciprocity (White, 
2002), which allow members of the close-knit venture capital community get to enjoy the 
benefits of attractive investment deals. Why VCs syndicate have much to do with their 
aim to seek social support. Researchers of the social capital theory provide the 
fundamentals of social network analysis while researchers of the venture capital industry 
conduct empirical research on VC co-investment activities and conclude the importance 
of social networks. Both branches of research have served the building blocks of this 
thesis. Table 2.2 at the end of the chapter summarizes the literature review for both 
theories. The row elements are the ten rationales of syndication resulting from both the 
corporate VC syndication and VC syndication in general. The column elements are the 
three dimensions and four principles of social networks. The names of representative 





2.9 Expectations of Corporate VC Syndication Patterns 
 
The literature review provides theoretical means of explaining the syndication patterns in 
corporate VCs. Before the empirical analysis conducted on the corporate VC syndication 
data, the following expected patterns are hypothesized based on the review of literature. 
1. The corporate venture capital network is not cohesive. 
There are three reasons for this hypothesis. First, a common view of social capital is that 
social capital is a creation of strategic behaviour of network members, rather than a 
byproduct of normal social interaction (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992; Gabbay & Leenders, 
1999). Unless corporate VCs have some motive of obtaining certain benefits from 
forming relationships with other corporate VCs, network ties would not form 
automatically. Second, strong bonds can potentially hurt a firm financially (Uzzi, 1997, 
1999), unless corporate VCs do not emphasize financial return, they would prefer weak, 
but useful bonds. Since weaker bonds do not exist in cohesive networks (Burt, 1992), the 
corporate VC network is thought to be non-cohesive. Finally, cohesive social networks 
severely limit the flow of information into a firm, preventing managers grasping their 
organizations fit with the competitive environment (Gargiulo & Bernassi, 1999), yet 
information exchange is a key motive of syndication (Bygrave, 1987, 1988), the 
corporate VC network cannot be cohesive. 
2. Most relationships in the network are indirect. 
This hypothesis is a corollary of the first hypothesis. The word cohesion implies direct tie. 
If the network is not cohesive, the number of direct ties is small. Since a tie can only be 




3. VCs in prominent positions are likely to hold structural hole positions in the 
network. 
Recall that a structural hole is a relationship of non-redundancy between two contacts 
(Burt, 1992, p.18).  Each structural hole serves as a bridge connecting otherwise 
disconnected networks (Burt, 1992); and like liaisons, they enable direct communication 
between formally separate units and functions (Mintzberg, 1979, p.162). Since structural 
hole is a measure for brokerage, an actor holding in a structural hole position can be 
thought as a broker as well.  
 Why do the VCs in most prominent positions also hold strongest brokerage power? 
The answer lies in the implications of prominence and brokerage. Prominence measures 
who is in charge (Haythornthwaite, 1996) in the whole network, and structural hole is a 
path to control and information benefits (Johanson, 2001, Burt, 1992) for the ego being 
considered. Although the two characteristics come from different viewpoints, they lead to 
the same conclusion, which is the level of resource control. Bygrave (1987, 1988) 
empirically validated the existence of resource exchange in the VC industry. Resources 
can be tangibles like goods, services, and money (Haythornthwaite, 1996) or intangibles 
like technical data, work advice, political opinions, and office rumors (Knoke, 2001). The 
mere access to the resources is a valuable asset to an organization. Hence, it follows that 
gaining control of the before mentioned resources grants competitive advantage to a VC 
in its network. Since only the prominent VCs have the power to control resources, 





4. Prominent VCs are likely to co-invest with other prominent VCs. 
VCs enjoy co-investing with prominent VCs because they have confidence in their 
partners reputation, experience and resources. Prominent VCs co-invest among one 
another for three potential benefits. First benefit is strategic alignment. Most corporate 
VCs invest in startups are more strategic than financial. Often, their purpose of 
investment is exploiting technological breakthroughs in young startups (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001, 2002). Making technological breakthroughs require industry experience 
and technical expertise, and prominent VCs hold both qualities. In order to support their 
strategic agenda, prominent VCs seek other VCs alike. The second benefit is extended 
resource accessibility. Prominent VCs have access to a wide range of financial and 
non-financial resources such as market information (Lockett and Wright, 2001). By 
sharing resources, all partners reduce uncertainty and increase confidence in an 
investment (Lockett and Wright, 2001). The benefit of resource sharing increases if the 
partnering VCs are prominent in the network because more resources are accessible for 
all involved parties. The last benefit is superior investment selection (Sah and Stiglitz, 
1986). Lead VCs prefer investing with other VCs with similar levels of experience, 
especially in early stages (Lerner, 1994) because the lead prefers asking its experienced 
partners for confirmation during the most uncertain stage of investment. Therefore, if a 
lead VC is prominent in the network, it most likely co-invests with another prominent VC 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Social networks exist in different levels of society. On a macro level there is the network of 
European Union; on a micro level there are professional associations and family ties. The 
venture capital network is also a social network, in which venture capital firms co-invest in 
promising projects. The patterns of co-investments are examined using social network 
analysis. 
 The method of social network analysis is employed to find the patterns of syndication. 
The data used to examine the patterns are coded from the 2002 Corporate Venturing 
Directory and Yearbook published by Asset Alternatives and VentureOne. The process of 
data collection and analysis are described. 
 This chapter consists of three sections following the introduction. Section 3.2 
introduces the notion of social network analysis; section 3.3 describes how data is coded 
from the Directory; and section 3.4 explains various data processes used to compute the 
findings.  
 
3.2 Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis is a study of relations of the actors in the network. It strives to 
derive social structure empirically based on observed relationships between actors, rather 
than labelling them as a group arbitrarily like teachers, constructors, students, investors, and 
so on (Haythornthwaite, 1996). As a social network analyst stated, The world is composed 
of networks, not groups. (Wellman, 1988, p.37)  An actor is an individual or an 
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organization in the network, a relation is a social tie between actors. The relations are 
established by the act of resource exchange. Resources shared between actors can be 
tangibles like supplies of goods, or intangibles like services and information.  
 
3.2.1 Three Dimensions of Social Relations 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) define three dimensions of social relations as direction, 
strength, and content. Direction indicates which actor sends or receives the relation. For 
instance, direction shows which VC initiates the intention to co-invest in a target firm, and 
which VC agrees to the syndication proposal. Direction also shows who sends information 
to whom. A social relation can also be undirected. An undirected relation provides no 
information on who is the sender and who is the receiver because the direction of resource 
flow is irrelevant. 
 Strength defines frequency of interaction between two actors. In venture capital 
syndication, strength is how often two VCs syndicate on deals. A couple of VCs 
syndicating in five portfolio firms are assumed to have a stronger relation than another 
couple that only syndicated in one portfolio firm.  
 Finally, content defines a specific substantive connection among actors, in other words, 
the kind of resources being exchanged, whether information or financial capital, both of 
which are common in venture capital syndication. 
 
3.2.2 Measurements of the Four Attributes of Social Network 
The four attributes of Social network, prominence, range, brokerage, and cohesion were 
defined in Chapter 2. The attributes measure different characteristics of a social network. 
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Recall that prominence measures who is in charge, range measures how far an actor 
can reach other actors, brokerage measures the extent of bridging connections, and 
cohesion describes the cohesiveness of the whole network. Although these attributes 
effectively characterize a social network, they are not quantitative. Further tools are needed 
to quantify the four attributes, thus two metrics are utilized to quantify each attribute. 
Degree and closeness determine prominence. Degree is the number of direct connections an 
actor has with other actors in the network. An actor with high degree is said to be in the 
thick of things. Closeness calculates the frequency an actor falls on the shortest path 
between two other actors. High closeness index is analogous to high efficiency in 
information transmission, because short distances mean fewer message transmissions, 
shorter times and lower costs (Hakimi, 1965). Therefore, the higher the degree and 
closeness, the more central an actor is in its network. 
 Reachability and geodesic distance compute range levels. Reachability indicates how 
many times a connection is established between two actors. In VC syndication, the 
reachability is a record of how many times two VCs co-invest in the same portfolio firm. 
Geodesic distance is the length of shortest path between two actors. The path can be direct 
or indirect. A direct path indicates a direct relation or tie, where no intermediaries are 
involved in establishing the relation. On the other hand, an indirect path indicates an 
indirect relation, where one or more intermediaries must be involved to make the relation 
possible. Small reachability and geodesic distance indices indicate cheaper cost of 
cooperation between actors. 
 Brokerage is measured by betweenness and structural hole. Betweenness is the extent 
to which an actor sits between two other actors. When an actor is located strategically on 
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the communication path between two others, it holds the power to influence information 
transmission, whether distorting the information or withholding it (Bavelas, 1948 and 
Shaw, 1954).  A structural hole is a connection of non-redundant contacts (Burt, 1992). A 
strong relation signals the absence of structural hole. For example, a husband-wife relation 
is not a structural hole, but a newly established relationship between a manager of a 
powerful industrial association and the CEO of a manufacturing firm that seeks clients who 
are members of the association is a structural hole. The manager of the association 
essentially acts as a broker for the manufacturing firm to gain access to a vast customer 
base. Thus, high betweenness and structural hole indices mean higher brokerage power of 
an actor. 
 Density and clique measure the cohesiveness of the whole network. Density determines 
how extensively actors in the network interact among each other. While density is an index, 
clique provides qualitative information on the structure of a network on a micro level. A 
clique is defined as a fully connected sub-network. A clique containing more actors is more 
cohesive than one containing fewer actors. Table 3.1 summarizes the metrics that measure 
the four attributes.            
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Table 3.1 Metrics for network attributes and their descriptions                                   
Attribute Metrics to measure 
the attribute 
Metric Descriptions 
Degree number of direct ties to an actor 1. Prominence 
Closeness frequency an actor falls on the shortest path 
between two other actors 
Reachability how many times a connection is established 
between two actors 
2. Range 
Geodesic distance length of shortest path between two actors 
Betweenness the extent to which an actor sits between two 
other actors 
3. Brokerage 
Structural hole connection of non-redundant ties 
Density how extensively actors in the network interact 
among each other 
4. Cohesion 
Cliques fully-connected sub-network 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
3.3.1 The 2002 Corporate Venturing Directory & Yearbook 
Data used for this research comes from the 2002 edition of Corporate Venturing Directory 
& Yearbook, which is part of The Venture Capital Analyst product line. The Directory is 
published by Asset Alternatives and VentureOne. The publishing firms gathered data from 
survey forms, telephone calls, e-mails, venture firm websites and news releases to produce 
206 entries of corporate venture programs. The Directory lists the profiles of 206 corporate 
venture programs. Each profile contains the parent company name, the program name(s), 
office location, names of key personnel, program details such as start year, fund allocation, 
total number of staff, goals of program, and investment activity and criteria, which include 
investment size range, funding stage, industry, and geographic preferences. Table 3.2 
shows a partial description of sample entries from the Directory. The sample entries have 
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the highest count of syndicated deals. In the context of social network, they are actors with 
the highest degree centrality.  
 Aside from the corporate venture program profiles, the Directory includes two other 
important pieces of information  profiles of portfolio firms and the names of independent 
venture capital firms that syndicated with the corporate venture program. However, these 
two pieces of information lack detail, and are summarized under the category of Recent 
Investments of each corporate venture program. Each record of the Recent Investments 
includes the portfolio firm name, its web address, business type, other co-investor names, 
and finally, the total amount of investment. 
Table 3.2 Partial description of Directory data  



















1. Intel Capital 1997 - 23 - 268 0.038 
2. GE Equity 1995 $1,800M 13 155 221 0.031 
3. Cisco Systems Inc. 1996 - 1 - 141 0.020 
4. Vertex Management Inc. 1988 $900M 8 31 124 0.017 
5. Comdisco Ventures 1987 $1,700M 1 - 101 0.014 
6. Mitsubishi International Corp. - - 1 - 94 0.013 
7. Sun Microsystems Inc. 1999 $400M 1 10 85 0.012 




5 - 84 0.012 
9. TI Ventures L.P. 1996 $100M 2 - 79 0.011 
10. Siemens Venture Capital 1999 500M 3 13 77 0.011 
11. Innovacom S.A. 1988 $400M 4 14 72 0.010 
12. Accenture Technology Ventures 1999 $1,000M 13 - 69 0.010 
13. Dell Ventures 1999 $1200M 1 20 68 0.010 
14. Qualcomm Ventures 2000 $500M 1 - 58 0.008 
15. Oracle Venture Fund 1999 $500M 1 - 57 0.008 
16. AOL Time Warner Investment  2001 - 1 - 51 0.007 
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Table 3.2 Partial description of Directory data (Continued) 















of total links 
the firm 
accounts for
17. Lucent Venture Partners LLC - - 1 - 51 0.007 
18. Corning Innovation Ventures 2000 $50M 1 - 50 0.007 
19. Motorola Ventures 1999 $100M 3 - 46 0.006 
20. 3i Group plc 1997 $250M 1 - 42 0.006 
21. VeriSign Inc. - - 1 - 41 0.006 
22. Mitsui & Co. Venture Partners 2001 $200M 2 - 41 0.006 
23. Intel Communications Fund 1999 $500M 1 - 38 0.005 
24. Infineon Ventures GmbH 1998 95M 3 14 38 0.005 
25. Philips Corporate Strategy, 
Venturing 
1998 - 3 10 38 0.005 
26. Sony Strategic Venture 
Investment 
- - 2 - 37 0.005 
27. Adobe Ventures L.P. 1994 $240M 2 - 37 0.005 
28. Juniper Networks Inc. - - 1 - 36 0.005 
29. Kodak Ventures Group 1982 $100M 3 6 35 0.005 
30. Hitachi Corporate Venture 
Capital Fund 
2000 $95M 2 - 34 0.005 
 
Note: the symbol - means data unavailable. 
  
 Three reasons justify the use of The Corporate Venturing Directory and Yearbook.  
First of all, it focuses on the corporate venturing activities. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the significance of corporate venturing is undeniable. David Barry, Vice President 
of venture capital at Asset Alternatives expresses that entrepreneurs and independent 
venture capitalists recognize the importance of ties to corporations. They learn that those 
corporations have the resources to make or break a company with their technology 
expertise, relationships, and due diligence (The Directory, 2002, p.5). This Directory 
provides an avenue to examine the influence of many established corporations through their 
corporate venture programs. 
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 Secondly, data from this Directory offers ease of data processing and statistical 
analysis. There are 206 entries corporate venture programs and 920 references of 
independent venture capital firms in the Directory. Together, they account for 1126 data 
entries. The amount of data is within the computation limits of the social network analysis 
software, UCINET 6.0, thus data sampling and statistical inferences are not needed.  
 Furthermore, UCINET 6.0 takes a master matrix of size 1126 by 1126 as the input 
data. This master matrix contains entries of zeros and ones, and is very sparse. Of the total 
1,266,750 entries (1126x1126-1126 diagonal row), only 2,789 or 0.22 percent of them are 
ones. 
 Lastly, data from this Directory is a record of 2001 venturing activities, and is the most 
up-to-date information on venture capital syndication. Furthermore, most prominent 
corporate venture programs are established after the year 1998, as can be seen from Table 
3.1 above. Hence, the venture capital network being examined is relatively new, and the 
results found from it are therefore current as well. 
 Although many benefits accompany the Directory, it has three limitations. To begin 
with, not all corporate venture programs are listed in this Directory. Unless a corporation is 
willing to participate in the surveys conducted by the publishing firms, even the most 
influential corporate venture programs cannot enter the study population of this research. 
Even though there is no need for data sampling from the Directory, study error cannot be 
avoided. Secondly, 2001 was a dreadful year for new high technology ventures. Following 
the burst of high tech bubbles, the economic plunge after the September 11 attack 
discouraged much investment activities in the United States. Some corporations, including 
the distinguished AT&T and Lucent Technologies decided to stop investing in start-ups 
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(The Directory, p.5). A considerable number of venture programs halted in 2001. The 2001 
edition has over 300 listings, containing over a hundred more listings than the 2002 edition. 
Therefore, the 2002 edition of the Directory may not offer the most representative picture 
of the corporate venture capital world. Lastly, according to data compiled by Asset 
Alternatives and VentureOne, the Directory is intended to be global (The Directory, p.5). 
However, the majority (161 out of 206, or 78 percent) of venturing programs listed in the 
Directory are from the United States, making the Directory data geographically biased. 
Table 3.3 offers the breakdown of the number of corporate venture programs by country. 
Unfortunately, there is no data available on the true number of corporate venturing 




Table 3.3 Breakdown of the number of corporate venture programs by country 
Country # of Programs 
United States 161 
Canada 8 
Germany 7 
















3.3.2 Data Coding 
The syndication information from the Directory is coded using Microsoft Excel 2002 in 
three stages. The results of the three-stage coding are three datasets recorded in separate 
Excel worksheets. Stage one involves converting corporate venture programs into numeric 
values. Since the Directory lists the programs in alphabetical order, they are converted into 







Table 3.4 Snapshot of Dataset I 
Program Name Assigned ID # 
ABB New Ventures Ltd. 1 
Accenture Technology Ventures 2 
Acer Technology Ventures 3 
  
Scientific-Atlanta Inc. 206 
  
 Stage two coding involves converting the referenced names of co-investors into 
numeric values. The co-investors can be another corporate venture program or an 
independent venture capital firm, but only the independent VC firms are coded in this stage. 
Because the co-investor names appear under the Recent Investments section of each entry 
of corporate venture program, the same 206 entries are examined again, except in more 
detail. The co-investor names are coded starting with the ID #207. The result of stage two 
coding is organized in Dataset II, which is shown in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 Snapshot of Dataset II 
Co-investor Name Assigned ID # 
A-LIVE Holdings II Inc. 207 
Abingworth Management Inc. 208 
ABN AMRO Capital (USA) Inc. 209 
  
Zurich Scudder Investments Inc. 1126 
 
 Stage three combines the results of Datasets I and II. It couples the IDs of venture 
programs that syndicated in common portfolio firms. The result of paired data is organized 




Table 3.6 Snapshot of Dataset III 







Finally, the paired data in Dataset III becomes the input data for social network analysis.  
UCINET 6.0 is the software used to compute various measurements of the venture capital 
social network. 
 
3.4  Data Processing 
 
3.4.1 UCINET 6.0 
UCINET is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social networks (Borgatti, Everett, 
and Freeman, 2002). The program allows file import from Excel. As well, it is able to 
convert paired data into matrices for further analysis. The program contains numerous 
network analytic routines. The routines enable the measurements of all four network 
attributes mentioned earlier. NetDraw is a subprogram of UCINET. It provides visual 
representations of networks in 2D or 3D space. Once a network is graphed, NetDraw can 
also reorient and manipulate the graph by simply clicking and dragging the cursor with a 
mouse. The version 6.0 of UCINET is used. The program is menu-based, user friendly and 
is easy to learn. It can accommodate all 1126 entries of Directory data at a reasonable 
computing speed.   
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 Other competing programs of social network analysis include STRUCTURE, Egonet, 
Pajek, MetSight, and dozens more. UCINET 6.0 is chosen because of its user friendliness, 
data processing capabilities, and its ability to work with Excel data files.  
 
3.4.2 Data Processing Procedures 
The data processing procedures are summarized in Figure 3.1 as a flowchart.  
 
 




























The first step in data processing was converting the Excel file where Dataset III resided into 
a file called nodelist1, which UCINET can read. The data contained in nodelist1 file looked 
exactly the same as the paired data in the Excel file, except with a special header. The 
header can simply be added on top of the Excel data or in a separate text editor. Next, 
UCINET read the nodelist1 file, and then converted the paired data into a matrix. Thus, the 
1126 pairs of co-investments became an 1126 by 1126 matrix. UCINET stored the matrix, 
and was ready for data analysis.  
Degree centrality was computed on the whole dataset. The output was all entries sorted 
by degree. Because it was not possible to graph 1126 programs and co-investors as nodes 
and their thousands of connections as edges, a sample was selected for ease of 
visualization. The sampling criterion was the degree centrality index. A subset of entries 
with the most degree indices was selected. The sample data was stored in another nodelist1 
file. The eight measurements of network attributes were degree, closeness, reachability, 
distance, betweenness, structural hole, density, and cliques.  UCINET computed them one 
by one, first on the sample data, then on the entire dataset. 
Lastly, the results of the measurements on the sample data were summarized into tables, 
and some figures were illustrated with NetDraw. The results on the entire dataset were sent 
to the Excel worksheets to be stored. Descriptive statistics were computed by Excel Data 












Chapter 3 provided information on data coding and data processing using MS Excel and 
UCINET 6.0. This chapter encapsulates the results of the data processes into diagrams and 
tables. More detailed discussions of the findings will be given in chapter 5. This chapter 
begins describing some observations of a network sample, followed by the findings on the 
entire dataset. The sample consists of 22 venture capital programs selected from the dataset 
of 1126 programs. These 22 programs (or actors of the whole network) were sampled 
because they accounted for more than 0.5 percent of total links or degree centralities. The 
other rationale behind choosing them is the ease of drawing. Because of their positions in 
the network, these 22 nodes nicely compose a sample network diagram. Recall that degree 
is the number of connections an actor has with all the other actors in the network. Since 
actors with high degrees are central in their network (Freeman, 1979), these 22 actors were 
therefore regarded as good candidates to illustrate the findings. The word actor is 
equivalent to node in the network, and these two words will be used interchangeably 
during the discussion.  
 The findings are categorized into four attributes of networks: prominence, range, 
brokerage, and cohesion. Specific metrics are used to measure each attribute. Table 4.1 
provides an overview of the attributes and metrics. Two metrics are chosen for each 
attribute for two reasons. The first reason comes from the act of reassurance. No one 
measurement can provide a complete picture of a network attribute, thus using two metrics 
enhances the level of understanding of the attribute in question. The second reason is the 
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possibility of substitution. In the event of one metric being impossible to compute due to 
the nature of the data, the other metric can serve the same function without too much 
compromise. For instance, closeness is a measure of prominence of a network, but it cannot 
accurately measure the prominence of the whole network because the whole network is not 
connected, and the closeness values would converge to zero. Therefore, degree is the other 
option that measures prominence.  
Table 4.1 Overview of attributes and metrics 
Attribute Metrics to measure the attribute 
1. Prominence degree, closeness 
2. Range reachability, geodesic distance 
3. Brokerage betweenness, structural hole 




4.2 The Network Sample  
 
Table 4.2 presents the program IDs and the program names of the actors selected for the 
sample. Intel Capital, program #0095 scores the highest degree centrality in the whole 
network, which means Intel Capital has initiated and successfully co-invested with 268 
other programs. It is important to note that this 22-node sample is in no way predicting or 
representing the findings of the entire dataset. It merely provides an intuitive means of 
explaining the concepts of the findings. It also makes the visualization of a network 
possible, since it is unrealistic to graph 1126 nodes and thousands of ties among them. 
Figure 4.1 is a visual representation of the sample network. Each directed edge (or arc) 
represents the intention of syndication from the actor of origin to the actor of destination. 
One other important fact to note is that the sample network completely ignores the 
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connections that the sample nodes have with other nodes outside the sample. The results of 
the findings are calculated and presented on the whole dataset later in the chapter.  
 
Table 4.2 Venture programs in the sample  firms accounting for more than 0.5% of 
total links (exclusive) 
 












Intel Capital #0095 268 0.038 
GE Equity #0075 221 0.031 
Cisco Systems Inc. #0036 141 0.020 
Vertex Management Inc. (Singapore Technologies Group) #0162 124 0.017 
Comdisco Ventures #0039 101 0.014 
Mitsubishi International Corp. #0125 94 0.013 
Sun Microsystems Inc. #0169 85 0.012 
IDG Technology Venture Investment Inc. (International 
Data Group) 
#0099 84 0.012 
TI Ventures, L.P. (Texas Instruments) #0177 79 0.011 
Siemens Venture Capital #0161 77 0.011 
Innovacom S.A. (France Telecom) #0071 72 0.010 
Accenture Technology Ventures (Accenture Ltd.) #0002 69 0.010 
Dell Ventures #0050 68 0.010 
Qualcomm Ventures #0144 58 0.008 
Oracle Venture Fund #0137 57 0.008 
AOL Time Warner Investment Corp. #0015 51 0.007 
Lucent Venture Partners LLC #0114 51 0.007 
Corning Innovation Ventures #0045 50 0.007 
Motorola Ventures #0127 46 0.006 
3i Group plc #1020 42 0.006 
VeriSign Inc. #0190 41 0.006 
Mitsui & Co. Venture Partners #0126 41 0.006
 



















 The network sample shown in Figure 4.1 is a miniature version of the whole network. 
It consists of nodes and links, where nodes represent the corporate or independent VCs and 
the links represent the number of syndications between two VCs. Before UCINET 
computes indices characterizing the network, some observations can be made from the 
picture above.  The two obvious observations are prominence and cohesion. GE Equity 
(#0075) and Intel Capital (#0095) have the most links in the sample, whereas Lucent 
Venture Partners (#0114) has the lowest degree centrality. Since Lucent only has one link 
with Sun Microsystems (#0169), it is the least prominent actor in the sample network. A 
special name for the least prominent node is isolate. Although the isolate does not play a 
central role in this particular sample network, it may have numerous connections with 
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actors in other networks. The other observation about the sample network is its 
cohesiveness. Cohesion describes the level of interaction among the actors in a network. As 
can be seen from the sample network diagram, the degree of interconnectedness is high 
among actors. Thus, this sample network is highly cohesive.  
 
4.3 Findings on the Whole Dataset 
 
This section presents findings on the whole dataset. The section first introduces each 
attribute and its metrics, and then presents the numeric network indices on the sample 22 
programs. Lastly, it shows the summary statistics and explains them in the context of 
syndication on the whole dataset.   
 
4.3.1 Prominence 
Prominence indicates who is central or who is in charge in the network. Table 4.3 shows 
the degree centrality and the closeness centrality of the sample 22 firms. The third column 
of Table 4.3 summarizes degree centralities of the 22 actors in the whole network. Intel 
Capital, the actor holding the most links is in the most prominent position. The second 
prominent firm is GE Equity, and the third is Cisco Systems. The fourth column of the 
table lists the normalized degree centrality, which is calculated as the degree divided by the 
maximum possible degree as a percentage. For example, of all the possible 1125 ties Intel 
Capital could establish, it actually established 268 ties, which is 23.8 percent of total 
possible ties. Nodes with high degree centralities play a more central role than the ones 
with low degree centralities. The fifth column of Table 4.3 gives the share of ties, which is 
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the proportion of ties an actor holds in the network. For instance, Mitsui & Co. Venture 
Partners holds 0.6 percent of all possible ties. 
 A second measure of prominence is closeness centrality. Closeness is calculated as the 
inverse of farness, which is the sum of shortest distance between a node and every other 
node in the same network. The node with the lowest sum of all distances is the central node 
because it does not depend on many intermediaries to relay messages (Bavelas, 1950 and 
Leavitt, 1951). The second half of Table 4.3 illustrates closeness information of the 22 
sample firms with two specific measures: in-closeness and out-closeness. Because the 
edges are directed, UCINET calculates two directions separately as in and out. 
Closeness centrality can only be calculated on connected graphs, because distance can be 
infinite if two nodes are not mutually reachable.  
Table 4.3 Degree centrality and closeness centrality of the sample 22 firms 
 
Program Name ID# Degree NrmDegree Share inClose outClose 
Intel Capital #0095 268 23.822 0.038 0.091 0.162 
GE Equity #0075 221 19.644 0.031 0.089 0.2 
Cisco Systems Inc. #0036 141 12.533 0.02 0.089 0.21 
Vertex Management Inc. #0162 124 11.022 0.017 0.092 0.108 
Comdisco Ventures #0039 101 8.978 0.014 0.089 0.178 
Mitsubishi International Corp. #0125 94 8.356 0.013 0.092 0.137 
Sun Microsystems Inc. #0169 85 7.556 0.012 0.094 0.098 
IDG Technology Venture 
Investment 
#0099 84 7.467 0.012 0.09 0.1 
TI Ventures, L.P. #0177 79 7.022 0.011 0.095 0.094 
Siemens Venture Capital #0161 77 6.844 0.011 0.093 0.102 
Innovacom S.A.  #0071 72 6.4 0.01 0.09 0.117 
Accenture Technology Ventures  #0002 69 6.133 0.01 0.089 0.291 
Dell Ventures #0050 68 6.044 0.01 0.089 0.176 
Qualcomm Ventures #0144 58 5.156 0.008 0.093 0.109 
Oracle Venture Fund #0137 57 5.067 0.008 0.092 0.101 
AOL Time Warner Investment 
Corp. 
#0015 51 4.533 0.007 0.089 0.267 
Lucent Venture Partners LLC #0114 51 4.533 0.007 0.09 0.102 
Corning Innovation Ventures #0045 50 4.444 0.007 0.089 0.172 
Motorola Ventures #0127 46 4.089 0.006 0.092 0.111 
3i Group plc #1020 42 3.733 0.006 0.096 0.089 
VeriSign Inc. #0190 41 3.644 0.006 0.093 0.091 
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Mitsui & Co. Venture Partners #0126 41 3.644 0.006 0.092 0.113 
  
 
 UCINET calculates degree centrality on each of the 1126 actors in the network. The 
total degree centrality is 7096, which is equivalent to 7096 direct ties in the dataset. Table 
4.4 summarizes the degree statistics. The mean degree centrality is 6, which means that on 
average, each venture program co-invests with six other programs. Some actors are 
significantly more prominent than others, which can be observed from the large variance.  
The maximum number of ties is 268, which is held by Intel Capital, whereas the minimum 
number of ties is 0, which applies to 131 least prominent actors. A very small number of 
actors enjoy a prominent position in the network. Table 4.5 shows that only two actors, 
Intel Capital and GE Equity have more than 200 direct ties, and the majority of actors have 
less than 10 direct ties.  











































 Although UCINET computes closeness indices for all actors and those indices for 22 
actors are listed in Table 4.3, they cannot accurately measure the prominence of the whole 
network. Because the whole network is not connected, many geodesic distances (farness) 
are infinite. Since closeness is an inverse of farness, the closeness values would converge to 
zero. Thus, degree centrality remains the only metric available to measure prominence. 
 The large variance in prominence levels leads to some speculations. Prominent VCs 
have the reputation, industry expertise and financial powers to attract other VCs in the 
Network. By participating in syndicated deals, especially with industry leaders, less 
well-known VCs increase their reputation (Bygrave, 1987). For example, the most 
prominent VC program, Intel Capital is backed by the longstanding reputation of Intel 
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Corporation. The Corporation has the reputation of the worlds largest chipmaker. The goal 
of Intel Capital is to support the Corporations mission of being the preeminent building 
block supplier to the worldwide Internet economy (The Directory, p.188). The fund has no 
geographic preferences, as its 23 worldwide branches can virtually cover all opportunities 
around the globe where the funds preferred industries reside. Because of Intel Capitals 
reputation, many junior VCs try to syndicate this powerful player. As long as Intel Capital 
sees a fit to its corporate strategy, other VCs, whether being the initiator or the receiver of a 
syndication proposal, are very unlikely to decline a syndication opportunity with Intel 
Capital. A similar argument applies to the second most prominent VC, GE Equity, owned 




Range indicates the extensiveness of an actors access to social capital in its network, both 
directly and indirectly. Consider three actors, X, Y, and Z. X has direct access to Y if X and 
Y have co-invested in a deal. If X can only interact with Z through Y, then X is said to have 
indirect access to Z. Reachability is one quantitative measure of range, and is expressed 
with zeros and ones or other numeric values a symmetric matrix. The numeric value 1 is 
placed in position (i,j) of the matrix if node j has a connection with i; otherwise the value 
0 is placed. In the context of syndication, the reachability value can be 2, 3 or 4 
and so on, These numbers mean that the two programs have co-invested in deals two, three 
or four times. The larger the value, the stronger the tie is because of more frequent 
interaction between two actors. 
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 The other quantitative measure of range is geodesic distance. Geodesic distance is the 
shortest distance between any two nodes. It can also be interpreted as the distance of the 
optimal path between two actors. The result of geodesic distances is stored in a symmetric 
matrix of size 1126 by 1126. A blank entry indicates the absence of a path between two 
nodes. The value 1 shows the shortest path possible, and it is an indication of a direct tie, 
whereas values 2 and 3 indicate indirect ties and longer paths. 
 While UCINET successfully computed the results of reachability and geodesic 
distance, it was only able to express them in the form of symmetric matrices. Since the 
matrix size of 1126 by 1126 is too enormous to present, MATLAB 6.1 was used to 
manipulate the two matrices, and some information were obtained. Table 4.6 summarizes 
the reachability findings. All entries of the reachability matrix contain one of three values, 
1, 2 and 3. The value 1 means a pair of actors co-invested in one portfolio firm, 2 
means two portfolio firms, and 3 means three portfolio firms. Intuitively, the more 
portfolio firms a pair of actors co-invest, the stronger the strength of their tie. Therefore, the 
three values can be interpreted as the weights of a tie, with 3 being the strongest. The 
result shows that only three pairs of actors have the strongest tie of weight 3; fourteen 





Table 4.6 Reachability information obtained using MATLAB 
 
There are 2752 pairs of actors that co-invested in one portfolio 
firm. 
Actors that co-invested in 2 portfolio 
firms: 
Actors that co-invested 




















 The results show that 2752 pairs of VCs invested in one portfolio firm, 14 pairs of 
invested in two portfolio firms, and only three pairs invested in three portfolio firms. 
Furthermore, no pairs invested in more than three portfolio firms. Based on the reachability 
data alone, most ties in the Network appear weak. However, one year of data is not 
sufficient to conclude whether most relationships are indeed weak because reciprocation of 
deal flow happens over time, and dont necessarily happen within the same year. Since 
reciprocation of deal flow is found to strengthen a relationship (Coleman, 1988), data from 
a longer period is needed for a more accurate conclusion. 
 Similarly, all entries of the geodesic distance matrix contained one of six values, and 
the values are simply 1 through 6. If there is an absence of a tie between two actors, an 
empty entry is shown in the matrix. Recall that geodesic distance is the optimal length of a 
path between two actors. The value 1 symbolizes a direct tie between a pair of actors. In 
other words, there is only one edge connecting two nodes. The value 2 symbolizes an 
indirect tie because it takes two edges to go from one node to another. Therefore, the larger 
the number, the longer the distance between two actors, and the more indirect their tie is. 
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Within the whole network, six is the longest optimal route connecting any two actors. Table 
4.7 summarizes the geodesic information provided by MATLAB. 
 
















As seen from the above table, most pairs of actors (2029 pairs) are connected with a 
geodesic distance of two, which means that they are only mutually reachable through a 
third party.  The second common distance is two, and a distance of six is least common.  
 The shortest geodesic distance in the Network is one, signaling a direct relationship, 
and the longest geodesic distance is six, signaling the most indirect relationship. Clearly, 
the more intermediaries two VCs have to go through, the more indirect their relationship is. 
The findings show that most pairs of VCs (39 percent) connect with one intermediary. The 





Brokerage is defined as the bridging connections to other networks. A broker node can act 
as a liaison, a representative, a gatekeeper, or a coordinator of information 
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(Haythornthwaite, 1996). The most common measure of brokerage is betweenness. 
Betweenness is the extent to which an actor sits between two other actors. The betweenness 
of node X is the sum of proportions of all geodesic passing through node X, where a 
geodesic is the shortest path between two nodes. The normalized betweenness is the 
betweenness divided by the maximum possible betweenness expressed as a percentage 
(UCINET 6.0). The third and fourth columns of Table 4.8 summarize betweenness and 
normalized betweenness of all sample nodes. Intel Capital has the highest betweenness in 
the whole network, which implies its high potential of information filtering and control. 
Actors with zero betweenness, such as Accenture Technology Ventures and 3i Group plc, 
although prominent, do not play a role of gatekeeper in the network, and have relatively 
less control of information flow. 
 Another means of measuring brokerage is structural hole. Burt (1992, p.18) defines 
structural hole as a relationship of non-redundancy between two contacts. According to 
Burt, maximum yield in structural hole co-exists with maximum number of non-redundant 
ties an actor has with other actors. One measure of structural hole Burt came up with is 
effective size of an egos network. It is calculated as the number of alters minus the average 
degree of alters within the ego network, not counting ties to ego (UCINET 6.0). An ego is a 
node being considered in an egocentric network; an alter is any node other than the ego in 
the same network. The result is an index of non-redundancy. The higher this index, the 
more non-redundant ties an ego has with other alters. The last column of Table 4.8 shows 
the effective sizes of all nodes in the network. Intel Capital has the most non-redundant ties, 




Table 4.8 Betweenness and effective size of the sample 22 firms 
Program Name ID# Betweenness nBetweenness EffSize 
Intel Capital #0095 8400.087 0.664 203.035 
GE Equity #0075 3649.913 0.289 180.173 
Cisco Systems Inc. #0036 1014.835 0.08 121.299 
Vertex Management Inc. #0162 2455.366 0.194 109.902 
Comdisco Ventures #0039 173.384 0.014 78.507 
Mitsubishi International Corp. #0125 2651.537 0.21 80.967 
Sun Microsystems Inc. #0169 2664.192 0.211 70.963 
IDG Technology Venture Investment #0099 459.58 0.036 70.088 
TI Ventures, L.P. #0177 2132.948 0.169 57.954 
Siemens Venture Capital #0161 2098.326 0.166 65.485 
Innovacom S.A.  #0071 555.545 0.044 50.188 
Accenture Technology Ventures  #0002 0.00 0.00 61.418 
Dell Ventures #0050 867.055 0.069 56.481 
Qualcomm Ventures #0144 1528.9 0.121 47.948 
Oracle Venture Fund #0137 1064.433 0.084 49.73 
AOL Time Warner Investment Corp. #0015 197.018 0.016 45.958 
Lucent Venture Partners LLC #0114 303.108 0.024 43.763 
Corning Innovation Ventures #0045 117.828 0.009 42.185 
Motorola Ventures #0127 805.42 0.064 35.99 
3i Group plc #1020 0.00 0.00 24.328 
VeriSign Inc. #0190 708.062 0.056 38.382 
Mitsui & Co. Venture Partners #0126 1124.04 0.089 32.331 
 
 The maximum betweenness is 8400 and is by Intel Capital. On the opposite of the 
spectrum, the lowest betweenness is zero, which is held by over 90 percent (1032 out of 
1126) of the actors. Table 4.9 shows betweenness summary statistic, and Table 4.10 gives 
the detail of the betweenness range breakdown. Such a large variance shows the uneven 











































 Parallel to betweenness, structural hole measures an actors brokerage power in the 
network. Table 4.11 gives the summary statistics of structural hole measures, and Table 
4.12 shows the breakdown of ranges. The maximum structural hole is held Intel Capital 
also, which agrees with the result in betweenness. The mean structural hole index is 
approximately 5, but the mode is 1. The large variance and the distribution of the structural 
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hole indices provide the same information as betweenness, that is, a handful of actors hold 
the strongest brokerage power in the network. 
 















































Contrary to the attributes of egocentric network, the final attribute, cohesion, describes the 
trait of a network as a whole.  One measure of cohesion is the number of cliques in the 
network. A clique is a fully connected sub-graph. Within a clique, all actors interact with 
each other directly, and their social bonds are considered strong. Figure 4.2 is an example 
of a clique. 
 
Figure 4.2 Clique Example 
 
 Another measure of cohesion is network density, which describe the extent to which 
actors in the network interact with each other. Density is a ratio of the number of actual ties 
to the number of potential ties in the network. The higher the density, the more interactions 
actors have within the network.  
 Clique and density measure the cohesion of a network. There are 1218 cliques present 
in the network. About 65 percent of them contain three or less actors and only five cliques 
(less than 1 percent) of cliques involve ten or more actors. Table 4.13 gives a detailed count 
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of cliques and their sizes. The overall portrait of cliques shows that the whole network is 
not cohesive.  
 
Table 4.13 Size and number of cliques 
 











Total Cliques 1218 
  
 To confirm the conclusion of low cohesiveness, density is measured. The density of the 
network is only 2.8 percent. This percentage explains that of all possible ties actors can 





5. Discussions and Conclusions 
5.1 Discussion and Conclusions about the VC Network 
 
The literature on social capital suggests many benefits of social networks. The benefits 
arise from trust (Nooteboom, 2001; Ferrary, 2002; Portes, 1998), resource exchange 
(Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995), mutual coordination and cooperation (Putnam, 1995), and 
liaison positions of control (Burt, 1992; Johanson, 2001; Higgins, 2001). Despite the two 
opposing approaches on the understanding of social capital, both the instrumental and the 
expressive views agree on the importance of social capital because it brings values to the 
members involved in a common social network. 
 The recognition of the importance of social capital leads to research on the 
characteristics of social networks where the social capital is embedded (Lin, 1986; Flap, 
1991; White, 2002). The study of social networks involves social network analysis, which 
is a study of relations of the actors in the network. It empirically derives relationships 
between actors and characterizes a social network as a whole (Haythornthwaite, 1996). 
 This thesis utilizes social network analysis to describe the patterns of syndication in the 
corporate venture capital network. Data of the corporate venture network comes from the 
2002 edition of Corporate Venturing Directory & Yearbook published by Asset 
Alternatives and VentureOne. The four key characteristics of the venture capital network 
studied are prominence, range, brokerage, and cohesion. The first half of this chapter 
presents the implications of findings from Chapter 4 with respect to the four hypotheses at 
the end of Chapter 2. The second half of this chapter discusses some implications of VC 
syndication on entrepreneurs, limitations of this research, and future research possibilities.  
 
 69
5.1.1 Non-cohesive Network 
 
The VC network was non-cohesive. There are a large number of cliques in the network. 
The 1126 actors in the network form 1218 cliques, so on average, each clique contains 
approximately two actors, which makes the network sparse. In addition, about 65 percent of 
cliques contain three or less actors. The large amount of cliques relative to the size of 
network suggests lack of cohesion in the network, which supports Hypothesis 1: the 
corporate venture capital network is not cohesive. 
 The lack of cohesion has three implications. First, VCs do not establish direct ties 
without a reason. A parallel, but more obvious implication is that VCs do not syndicate 
without any motives. Because creating and maintaining syndicating relationships cost time 
and energy, VCs initiate and mediate them only if they believe they can extract social 
capital from those relationships (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992; Gabbay & Leenders, 1999). 
Secondly, strong and direct ties harm VCs financially because the co-dependent bonds limit 
their investment options to only the ones they are familiar with (Uzzi, 1997, 1999). Because 
corporate venturing is an activity of seeking technological breakthroughs, VCs do not wish 
to limit their investment options with many direct ties. Lastly, cohesive networks limit the 
flow of information because often VCs receive the same information from different direct 
sources. Therefore, having access to non-redundant sources of information is crucial (Burt, 
1992). Since information exchange is a key motive of syndication (Bygrave, 1987, 1988), 






5.1.2 Indirect Ties 
 
The second finding supports Hypothesis 2: Most relationships in the network are indirect. 
The findings on range show that most actors are connected with a geodesic distance of two, 
indicating they are only mutually reachable through a third party. The shortest geodesic 
distance is one, signaling a direct relationship, and the longest geodesic distance is six, 
signaling the most indirect relationship. The result shows approximately 13 percent of 
direct, leaving the majority of ties indirect. This finding is a consequence of the previous 
finding, because direct ties are the building blocks of a cohesive network. Since the 
network is not cohesive, most ties must be indirect. The implications of indirect ties are 
equivalent to those for non-cohesiveness. 
 
5.1.3 Prominence and Brokerage Relation 
 
The third important finding is the connection between prominence and brokerage. Most 
prominent actors are the same as actors in structural hole positions. Since structural hole 
measures brokerage power, the higher the efficient size of the structural hole, the more 
brokering power an actor holds. Appendix I provides a parallel comparison of the two 
attributes. The first column of the table lists the names of the most prominent firms in the 
network, and the third column of the table lists the names of the firms with the most 
brokerage power in the network. It is interesting to note that all but four firms without 
bolded names in the table are the most prominent actors as well as the most powerful 
brokers. Furthermore, the top eight firms follow the same order in terms of their level of 
prominence and brokerage. Most of the firms are within one or two positions of difference 
on the two scales.  
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Appendix I implies an obvious relation between the two attributes. The observations from 
the table support Hypothesis 3: VCs in prominent positions are likely to hold brokerage 
power in the network. 
 A more important question is why do prominent VCs also hold strong brokerage 
power? The answer is the commonality of these two attributes, and the commonality is the 
power to control resources. Prominent VCs are in control by definition. For example, Intel 
Capital, a reputable and experienced VC, does not just attract sweet deals; it has access to 
valuable information and financial resources because of its central position in the network. 
Brokers, by definition, have the advantage of firsthand information from different 
non-redundant sources. Prominent actors and brokers enjoy the same sense of competitive 
advantage in the network because of their unique and profitable positions. Therefore, they 
tend to be the same set of firms. 
 
5.1.4 Syndication among Prominent VCs 
 
The last crucial finding is that prominent VCs tend to syndicate with other prominent VCs. 
This finding supports Hypothesis 4: Prominent VCs are likely to co-invest with other 
prominent VCs. Recall Figure 4.1, which provides a visual representation of the intensity of 
syndication among the 22 most prominent VCs. The diagram shows that the sub-graph of 
these 22 VCs is cohesive indicating the frequency of syndication among them. 
 Prominent VCs prefer syndicating with other VCs similar to them because three 
benefits arise from their similarity. The first benefit is strategic alignment. Because most 
VCs invest in start-ups for strategic reasons rather than financial reasons (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001, 2002), syndicating with partners that possess the necessary experience and 
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expertise to make the strategy whole is favourable. The second benefit is resource 
accessibility. Prominent VCs have access to a wide range of resource. A prominent VC 
would like to syndicate with another prominent VC to increase the resource access. The 
final benefit is superior investment selection. Lead VCs prefer syndicating with partners of 
similar experience (Lerner, 1994). If the lead is prominent, it most likely favours other 
prominent VCs to be its partners. 
 
5.2 Implications for the Entrepreneurs 
 
While it is true that social capital is a valuable asset to the VCs involved in the Network, 
but how does the conclusions from this research help the entrepreneurs in obtaining funding 
from the VCs? Some implications for the entrepreneurs are presented in this section. 
 Most VC literature focuses on understanding the entrepreneurs from the perspective of 
the VCs. They prescribe how to select potentially promising projects, how to successfully 
bring a good idea to commercialization, when to invest, and who to co-invest with.  
However, there is not much research on what entrepreneurs should do when seeking 
venture capital funding. Some researchers begin to address the implications of VC 
syndication on entrepreneurs. 
 As a general note, entrepreneurs should approach VCs selectively. The VCs can either 
be independent VC firms or corporate VCs. There are three reasons for it. First, VCs 
provide more than just money. They supply information about an industry, i.e. information 
about competitors, suppliers, customers, and other investors. More importantly, they bring 
in management expertise to the entrepreneurs, especially the industry-specific knowledge 
on markets and technology (Bygrave, 1987). Second, VCs favour referred deals than cold 
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deals, meaning deals without any prior introduction. VCs spend much effort developing 
networks of referrers. Fried and Hisrich (1994) found that while VCs often receive many 
proposals cold, they rarely invest in them. Most funded proposals come from referrals.  
The referrers are usually people who the VCs know personally, or who they have worked 
with in the past. Why do they prefer referred deals? Fried and Hisrich (1994) came up with 
two main reasons: 1) referred deals are more likely to pass the initial screening if the 
venture capitalist has confidence in the referrers judgement; 2) the referrer most likely 
understands the type of projects the venture capitalist finds attractive. Entrepreneurs should 
try to tap into the network of referrals because it increases the chance of their proposal 
being selected. Finally, news spreads rapidly, especially in tightly-integrated VC networks.  
If the entrepreneur blindly approaches any venture capitalist and is denied funding, the 
probability of obtaining another VC funding is greatly reduced.  Bygrave (1988) found 
that once a proposal is in the hands of one of the top 61 VC firms in the U.S., news of its 
existence spread swiftly. If it is turned down by one VC, others will soon find out. 
 It is true that a new ventures success resides in the abilities of the entrepreneur, who 
has to combine the talent, skill, experience, ingenuity, leadership, education, and hard work 
in creative ways and to deploy them to meet customer needs in a manner that could not 
easily be imitated (Amit, Glosten, and Müller, 1990). However, the entrepreneurs abilities 
do not always lead to venture success. If he/she desires to obtain VC funding, he/she must 
understand the behaviour of VCs, and carefully select the appropriate investors to extract 






A number of limitations are present with this thesis. The first limitation resides in the 
nature of data. Because the VC Directory contains only one year of data, many aspects of 
the Network are unaccounted for. For instance, the strength of VC ties cannot be validated 
because a study based on only one year of data does not account for changes in the 
Network over time. For example, some ties may be stronger than indicated because VCs 
may have syndicated in five or more portfolio firms over a period of three years. However, 
this information is not shown in the data available. Hence to discuss whether repeat 
co-investments exist between actors based on past investment success is beyond the scope 
of this research because of lack of data.   
 Secondly, any network is dynamic. The study of the Network can only catch a snapshot 
of the Network, which does not represent a true picture of the Network at another time. To 
compound the inaccuracy, data collected from the Directory was done over a period of 
time. The moment the Directory was published, data was already outdated. All the 
previously concluded attributes about the Network may no longer exist. Unfortunately there 
is no way to change the dynamic nature of the Network, therefore one should keep in mind 
that the findings are merely a snapshot of the network in a past time, and may not represent 
the truth today. 
 Lastly, the research assumes the 2002 Corporate Venturing Directory and Yearbook to 
be an adequate representation of the corporate venturing network in general. The publisher 
may have left out some key actors in the network because some programs fail to participate 
in the study. Therefore, the truth about the corporate VC network may look very different 
in reality.  
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5.4 Future Research 
 
A larger scope of the same research methodology can be applied to several years of 
syndication data. For example, the Corporate Venturing Directories of years 2000 through 
2003 can be explored to find a more accurate pattern of syndication in the VC Network. 
Since syndication is not exclusive to venture capital funds, similar research can be done on 
other types of investments such as pension, insurance, and bank investments. By using the 
social capital theory and social network analysis, different patterns of syndication can be 
drawn on various investments. Another possible area of research is using game theory or 
transactions cost theory, as opposed to social capital, to explain patterns of syndication in 
VC networks. Furthermore, linking the network characteristics to attributes, such as size of 
funds managed, funding preferences, about the corporate venture programs is another 
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Appendix I: Prominence and brokerage comparison  
 
Program Name Degree Program Name  EffSize
Intel Capital 268 Intel Capital 203.035
GE Equity 221 GE Equity 180.173
Cisco Systems Inc. 141 Cisco Systems Inc. 121.299
Vertex Management Inc. 124 Vertex Management Inc. 109.902
Comdisco Ventures 101 Mitsubishi International Corp. 80.967
Mitsubishi International Corp. 94 Comdisco Ventures 78.507
Sun Microsystems Inc. 85 Sun Microsystems Inc. 70.963
IDG Technology Venture 
Investment 84
IDG Technology Venture 
Investment 70.088
TI Ventures, L.P. 79 Siemens Venture Capital 65.485
Siemens Venture Capital 77
Accenture Technology 
Ventures  61.418
Innovacom S.A.  72 TI Ventures, L.P. 57.954
Accenture Technology 
Ventures  69 Dell Ventures 56.481
Dell Ventures 68 Innovacom S.A.  50.188
Qualcomm Ventures 58 Oracle Venture Fund 49.73
Oracle Venture Fund 57 Qualcomm Ventures 47.948
AOL Time Warner Investment 
Corp. 51
AOL Time Warner Investment 
Corp. 45.958
Lucent Venture Partners LLC 51 Lucent Venture Partners LLC 43.763
Corning Innovation Ventures 50 Corning Innovation Ventures 42.185
Motorola Ventures 46 VeriSign Inc. 38.382
3i Group plc 42 Motorola Ventures 35.99
VeriSign Inc. 41 Infineon Ventures GmbH 35.084
Mitsui & Co. Venture Partners 41 Philips Corporate Strategy 34.991
 
